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CASENOTE; Lair v. Motl: A Step Back in Montana’s Fight Against
Corruption
Dillon Haskell
I. INTRODUCTION
States that wish to limit campaign contributions may do so only
by showing an important state interest in combating actual quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance.1 For many years, courts gave actual and
apparent corruption a broad definition, but the last decade of Supreme
Court rulings have narrowed it.2 In Lair v. Motl,3 the United State District
Court for the State of Montana was presented with the question of whether
Montana had an important state interest in combating quid pro quo
corruption and whether its campaign contribution limits were closely
drawn to that end.4 The court had already answered this question before.5
But here, the district court had the challenging task of distinguishing
acceptable state interests in a post-Citizens United v. FEC6 world.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Doug Lair, Steve Dogiakos, John Milanovich, American
Tradition Partnership, and multiple other political committees and
political party organizations brought the action.7 They alleged that several
of Montana’s campaign finance and election laws were unconstitutional,
and they named James Murry, Steve Bullock, and Leo Gallagher as
defendants.8
Doug Lair and Steve Dogiakos each hoped to give financial
contributions in excess of the statutory limitations to Montana candidates
running for political office.9 John Milanovich, a Bozeman businessman
who had run for state office in the past, alleged the contribution limits had

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
Compare, e.g., id. to Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt. PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
3
189 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (D. Mont. 2016) [hereinafter Lair III].
4
Id.
5
Montana Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (an appeal affirming the
district court’s decision).
6
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7
Lair v. Murry, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078 (D. Mont. 2012), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Lair v.
Bullock, 787 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2015), and rev'd and remanded sub nom. Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d
736 (9th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Lair I].
8
Id. at 1079.
9
Id. at 1078. Lair is also a Montana director for American Tradition Partnership. Associated Press,
ATP Directors Reveal Identities in Court Filing, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Apr. 15, 2013, available at
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/atp-directors-reveal-identities-in-courtfiling/article_10206efa-b558-52fe-b906-737e6a3d56bb.html.
1
2
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been an obstacle when running for office.10 American Tradition
Partnership is a political committee that had previously brought challenges
to Montana’s campaign finance laws.11 It also alleged here, as it had
before, that Montana’s campaign contribution limits violated its right to
free speech.12
Defendant James Murry was the Commissioner of Political
Practices at the time of the initial complaint, Steve Bullock was the
Attorney General for the State of Montana, and Leo Gallagher was the
Lewis and Clark County Attorney.13 Murry was replaced by Jonathan
Motl, the current Commissioner of Political Practices, by the time the
district court handed down its May 2016 ruling.14 Bullock was also
replaced by Tim Fox, the current Attorney General.15 Gallagher has
remained the Lewis and Clark County Attorney.16
Plaintiffs initially brought their suit on September 6, 2011, in the
Billings Division of the District of Montana, but the case was later
transferred to the Helena Division upon Defendants’ motion for a change
in venue.17Almost immediately in the case Plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of five Montana statutes
regulating political campaigns.18 Ultimately, the court granted Plaintiffs’
motion as to three of the five statutes.19 The parties agreed to resolve the
controversy surrounding the individual and political committee
contribution limits and the political party contribution limits in a bench
trial, which was held from September 12, 2012, to September 14, 2012.20
At trial, Plaintiffs supplied the court with testimony from
witnesses representing multiple political committees alongside testimony
from would-be donors and candidates for political offices.21 The general
consensus among Plaintiffs’ witnesses was that the contribution limits
prevented many donors from giving more to candidates and prevented

10

Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
See Am. Tradition P’ship., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
12
See id.
13
Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
14
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1026.
18
Id. at 1027. The statutes at issue were: MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–35–225(3)(a) (2011), which required
authors of campaign materials about another candidate’s voting record to disclose the candidate’s full
voting record for the bill at issue; § 13–37–131, which made it “unlawful for a person to misrepresent
a candidate's public voting record with knowledge that the assertion is false or with a reckless disregard
of whether or not the assertion is false”; § 13–37–216(1), (5), which limited individual and political
committee campaign contributions; § 13–37–216(3), (5), which limited aggregate contribution
amounts for all political parties; and § 13–35–227, which prevented direct contributions to campaigns
or independent campaign expenditures by corporations.
19
Id. Defendants were enjoined from enforcing the disclosure requirements of candidate voting
records, the political civil-libel statute, and the statute barring corporate contributions and
expenditures. § 13–37–216(1), (3), (5) remained at issue for the Court’s bench trial.
20
Id.
21
Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1082–83.
11
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candidates from effectively promulgating their messages.22 Witnesses for
Defendants testified that much more than monetary contributions go into
running an effective campaign, like eliciting help from volunteers.23 They
also testified that Montana’s limits did not prevent effective
campaigning.24
An expert for Plaintiffs, Clark Benson, testified about his analysis
of campaign spending in Montana elections from 2004 to 2010.25 Benson
found that nearly a third of campaign contributions were at the maximum
level allowable by statute and 40% of candidates received the maximum
allowable aggregate limit from their parties.26 He also found that the
average campaign spends 7% more funds than it raises, concluding that
campaigns struggle to meet their financial needs and communicate
effectively with voters.27
Following the bench trial, on October 3, 2012, the court issued an
order declaring the contribution limits unconstitutional.28 In reaching this
first decision, the court relied heavily on the United States Supreme
Court’s plurality opinion in Randall v. Sorrell.29 Although the Ninth
Circuit had previously upheld Montana’s contribution limits in Montana
Right to Life Association v. Eddleman,30 the district court believed that
Eddleman was no longer binding because of the intervening decision in
Randall.31
After the order, Defendants filed a notice of appeal and a motion
to stay pending appeal.32 On October 16, 2012, the Ninth Circuit granted
Defendant’s motion to stay for the duration of the appeal, believing
Defendants were likely to succeed because Eddleman was not abrogated
in full by Randall.33 On May 26, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued its
opinion.34 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision, holding
that “the district court applied neither Citizens United's new formulation
of what constitutes an important state interest nor the correct formulation
of whether the state's contribution limits are ‘closely drawn’ to the state's
goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.”35 The Ninth

22

Id.
Id. at 1084.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1080.
26
Id. Defendants’ expert witness, Edwin Bender, found similar campaign contribution statistics to
Benson’s. Id. at 1083–84.
27
Id. at 1081.
28
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
29
Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1087–94 (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)).
30
343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).
31
Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
32
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
33
Id. at 1027–28.
34
Id. at 1028. The opinion was later reissued and amended on September 1, 2015. Any references to
Lair II in this note reference the amended opinion.
35
Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Lair II]. The Ninth
Circuit explained that the closely drawn test used in this quote is a test that “ensures the state's
23

18

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 78

Circuit reasoned that Montana’s campaign contribution limits needed to
be “tested under the new and more restrictive standard of Citizens United,
and the correct ‘closely drawn’ test [from Eddleman].”36
After the case returned to the district court, the court held a status
conference on November 10, 2015, where it agreed to additional time for
discovery to show whether there was an important state interest behind the
contribution limits.37 Each party filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, and on May 17, 2016, the court issued its opinion.38 It held that
(1) the state failed to show that the campaign contribution limits furthered
the important state interest of combating quid pro quo corruption, (2) the
campaign contribution limits did not narrowly focus on that important
state interest, and (3) the campaign contribution limits prevented
candidates from acquiring the resources necessary to fund effective
campaigns.39 Therefore, under this new standard, the court held Montana’s
campaign contribution limits to be unconstitutional.40
III. HOLDING
While in Eddleman the court held Montana’s campaign
contribution laws to be constitutional, the Ninth Circuit instructed the
district court to use the Citizens United standard for what constitutes an
important state interest for campaign contribution limitations.41 Therefore,
the court’s analysis followed the framework from Eddleman, but it was
also guided by the Citizens United standard. The court would uphold
Montana’s campaign contribution limits if:
(1) there is adequate evidence that the limits further the
sufficiently important state interest of combating quid pro
quo corruption or its appearance, and (2) if the limits are
closely drawn, meaning they (a) focus narrowly on the
above interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate
with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass
sufficient resources to wage an effective campaign.42
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagreed about what qualified as quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance. Plaintiffs argued that quid pro quo
corruption only occurs when there is an actual exchange of value for an
contribution limits are not lower than needed to accomplish the state's goal of preventing quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance.” Id. at 740 n.4.
36
Lair II, 798 F.3d at 740.
37
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1028. Note that the text of the opinion states that a status conference was
held on November 10, 2016. The date has been corrected to match the timeline of the case.
38
Id. at 1024.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1031.
42
Id.
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official’s improper promise or commitment.43 Defendants argued that
Plaintiffs failed to acknowledge the standard also covers the appearance
of quid pro quo corruption.44 They maintained quid pro quo corruption or
its appearance is a “know it when you see it” inquiry.45 Therefore,
Defendants stressed that their evidentiary burden was low.46
While the district court rejected Plaintiffs’ definition of quid pro
quo corruption or its appearance, it also rejected Defendants’ contention
that the campaign contribution limits further the important state interest of
combating corruption.47 The court found that in each instance of
corruption submitted by Defendants, legislators either rejected offers that
would have amounted to corruption, or they pledged to align themselves
with corporate agendas they would have likely been aligned with
anyway.48 In fact, the court went so far as to state, “[I]f anything, the
evidence shows that Montana politicians are relatively incorruptible.”49
In the second part of its analysis, the court held that Montana’s
campaign contribution limits failed the “closely drawn” portion of the
Eddleman test for two reasons: first, the statutes were not narrowly
focused on an anti-corruption interest,50 and second, the statutes “prevent
candidates from amassing sufficient resources to wage effective
campaigns.”51 To determine how narrowly focused the statutes were, the
court looked to the Montana’s voter information pamphlet describing the
original arguments in support of the contribution limit measures.52
According to the court, the pamphlet emphasized the “impermissible
interests of reducing influence and leveling the playing field”—
justifications for contribution limits that were soundly rejected by the
Supreme Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.53 The
court also found, based on the original testimony from experts from both
parties, that the average competitive campaign spends 7% more money
than it raises.54 Therefore, the court reasoned that the contribution limits
prevented adequate funding for campaigns and gave incumbents an unfair
43

Id. at 1032.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Defendants also cited multiple examples of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption in Montana
politics. These included: a letter from a senator to other senators encouraging them to support a bill
favored by a PAC so the PAC would continue to give campaign contributions; an offer of $100,000
to a group of legislators in exchange for pushing forward a right-to-work bill; candidates pledging
“100% support” for corporate groups’ legislative agendas in exchange for campaign assistance from
the groups; and two state district court decisions that found candidates to have engaged in quid pro
quo corruption and a third decision where a candidate allegedly accepted an illegal contribution as part
of quid pro quo. Id. at 1033–34.
47
Id. at 1034.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1035.
51
Id. at 1035–36.
52
Id. at 1035.
53
Id. (citing McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450–51) (emphasis in original).
54
Id. at 1036.
44
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advantage.55 Altogether, even if the court had found the existence of an
important state interest, it concluded the limits would have still failed the
Eddleman closely-drawn analysis.56 Accordingly, the court granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and found the contribution limits
unconstitutional.57
IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to apply the new
standard for important state interests for contribution limits from Citizens
United. The only important state interest for a contribution limit after
Citizens United is the prevention of actual quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance. The district court, however, applied a heightened standard,
requiring Montana to show actual quid pro quo corruption. Then, the court
applied an erroneous standard for determining whether the limits are
narrowly focused to Montana’s interest. Finally, the court reached the
inaccurate conclusion that candidates are unable to “amass sufficient
resources to wage an effective campaign.”
A. Evolution of “Corruption”
The key difference between this case and prior decisions about
contribution limits is the United States Supreme Court’s evolving—or
rather, devolving—definition of corruption. The starting point for any
campaign finance case is the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v.
Valeo.58 There, campaign contribution limits were held to be constitutional
so long as they were enacted to prevent actual corruption or the appearance
of corruption that can result from contributions made in excess of the
limits.59 While preventing corruption was a valid important state interest,
the Court never clearly defined corruption. For many years, the Court saw
corruption as “not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to
the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors.”60
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit first evaluated Montana’s contribution
limits under the Buckley and Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC61

55

Id.
Id.
57
Id. at 1038. It is also worth noting that Rick Hill, a former candidate for governor, became a plaintiffintervenor in the case after the court first ruled the campaign contribution limits unconstitutional in
October 2012. Between the court’s ruling and the stay issued by the Ninth Circuit just a few days later,
Rick Hill accepted a $500,000 donation for his campaign. Although he had been threatened with an
enforcement action for treble damages, the court’s ruling here also eliminated any possibility of a
judgment against him. Id.
58
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
59
Id. at 26.
60
Shrink, 528 U.S. at 389.
61
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
56
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standards.62 In Eddleman, the Ninth Circuit synthesized Buckley and
Shrink into a uniform test:
[S]tate campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1)
there is adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a
sufficiently important state interest, and (2) if the limits
are “closely drawn”—i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on
the state's interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate
with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass
sufficient resources to wage an effective campaign.63
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that Montana had shown an
important state interest in preventing corruption or its appearance in
Montana’s electoral system.64 The Ninth Circuit also found that Montana’s
contribution limit statutes were closely tailored to achieve its purpose.65
In 2010, the Supreme Court revisited Buckley and Shrink’s
definition of corruption in Citizens United.66 Its decision reined in the
broad terms by which a state could show a sufficiently important
government interest in preventing corruption.67 In Citizens United, the
Court held that only the prevention of actual or apparent quid pro quo
corruption could satisfy the requirement for an important state interest for
campaign contribution limits.68 Where Citizens United left any remaining
doubt, McCutcheon solidified the Court’s intent: “Any regulation must
instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its
appearance. That Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of
an official act for money.”69
When the district court first approached Lair I, it faced a difficult
task. While each case presented challenges to different statutes, Lair I and
Eddleman were nearly identical challenges to the same individual
contribution limits.70 However, major Supreme Court decisions had
drastically changed the way the district court was to analyze Montana’s
interest in maintaining contribution limits. The district court assumed
Montana still had an important state interest for the limits because of
Eddleman, but it believed the Supreme Court’s decision in Randall v.
Sorrell abrogated Eddleman’s closely-drawn test.71

62

Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Shrink, 528 U.S. 377).
Id. at 1092.
64
Id. at 1098.
65
Id.
66
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
67
Id. at 359.
68
Id.
69
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).
70
Compare Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1077, to Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085.
71
Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
63
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that Randall had not
abrogated the test from Eddleman because Randall’s closely-drawn test
came from a Supreme Court plurality opinion, making it nonbinding. 72
Instead, on remand, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to reuse
the Eddleman closely-drawn test.73 This time, however, the district court
was to use the more limited important state interest from Citizens United
and McCutcheon.74 The broad definition from Shrink could no longer
apply, so the district court was given a challenging task once more:
distinguish whether the state’s interest, which had already met the standard
from Shrink, could also meet the quid pro quo standard from Citizens
United. Effectively, the district court had to decide where the state’s
evidence fell on the spectrum of corruption.
B. Montana’s “Relatively Incorruptible” Politicians
President George Washington once wrote, “Few men have virtue
to withstand the highest bidder.”75 The principles underlying President
Washington’s quote, while profound, are not exceedingly complex or
convoluted; history is riddled with examples of corruption, and one does
not have to look far to ascertain President Washington’s meaning.
However, contrary to this concept, the district court made the peculiar
statement that Montana politicians seem “relatively incorruptible.”76
That statement, made in regards to Defendants’ examples of
alleged quid pro quo corruption, is dubious at best. The court argued that
Defendants’ evidence of corruption only proved that Montana politicians
were either rejecting external attempts to influence them or the external
attempts came from groups whose agendas they would have aligned with
anyway.77 While the legislators’ refusal to engage in corruption certainly
speaks to their virtuous characters, the court failed to recognize that the
very existence of these opportunities amounts to the appearance of quid
pro quo corruption—something Montana’s campaign finance limits are
meant to curtail.78 The court even conceded that Montana had shown
opportunities for corruption exist: “[T]he evidence shows that despite a
hand-full of opportunities, legislators chose to keep their noses clean.”79

72

Lair II, 798 F.3d at 747.
Id. at 747–48.
74
Id.
75
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Letter from George Washington to Major-General Robert Howe, in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, (Worthington Chauncey Ford & New York and London: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons eds., 1890), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/washington-the-writings-ofgeorge-washington-vol-vii-1778-1779.
76
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1034.
77
Id.
78
See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092 (stating “Montana asserts that the campaign contribution limitation
on individuals and PACs is necessary to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana
politics.”).
79
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (emphasis added).
73
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However, the court still concluded Montana had failed to show it had an
important state interest.80
Although the court noted earlier in its analysis that the state did
not need to show actual corruption was taking place to prove an important
state interest,81 the court’s indifference to Defendants’ evidence is wholly
contradictory to that. If these examples are not evidence of the appearance
of quid pro quo corruption, then it is unclear what would satisfy the court’s
test. The court seems to indicate that so long as politicians “keep their
noses clean”82 when they have the opportunity to engage in illegal
transactions, the state has no interest in preventing the opportunity itself.
But the fact that these types of deals are being offered in the first place
must certainly be the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Whether the
politicians acquiesce to the deal should not be relevant to the analysis of
the state’s interest. The fact that the offer is made should be enough to
satisfy this issue.
Instead, the court has required a heightened standard of proof for
the state’s interest. On remand, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court
to look for the state’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance. The district court, however, interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s
directive to require Defendants to show a “real harm to the election process
or to the public's interest in that process.”83 This interpretation was simply
incorrect. While the state’s important interest could have been to prevent
actual quid pro quo corruption, it could also have been to prevent its
appearance.84
C. Narrowly Focused
To begin its closely-drawn Eddleman analysis, the court assumed
for argument’s sake that there was an important state interest for
Montana’s contribution limits.85 Even assuming there was an important
state interest, the court concluded that the contribution limits were not
narrowly focused and did not allow a candidate to wage an effective
campaign.86 The only change in the legal test between this case and
Eddleman was McCutcheon’s narrowing of the state’s important interest,
so the court’s analysis of narrowly focused should have been very
similar.87 Because Eddleman and the case here share similar facts, holding
constant an affirmative important state interest should have yielded a
similar conclusion. Instead, by excluding precedent set by the Ninth
80

Id.
Id. at 1032.
82
Id. at 1034.
83
Id.
84
Lair II, 798 F.3d at 740.
85
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1034–35.
86
Id.
87
Lair II, 798 F.3d at 747–49.
81
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Circuit and Supreme Court and disregarding Montana’s important state
interest, it seems the court subjected Montana’s interest to a higher level
of scrutiny than required.
The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have both held that
direct contributions are most closely linked to quid pro quo corruption. In
Buckley, the Supreme Court reasoned that contribution limits focus
“precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions, the narrow
aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for
corruption have been identified. . .”88 Even as the Court reeled in the broad
definition of corruption in McCutcheon, it still recognized the strong link
between the potential for corruption and direct contributions: “[T]he risk
of quid pro quo corruption is generally applicable only to ‘the narrow
category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate
or officeholder.’”89 The Ninth Circuit has viewed contribution limits the
same way, holding that a Hawaii contribution limit law was “closely
drawn because it target[ed] direct contributions . . . to officeholders and
candidates, the contributions most closely linked to actual and perceived
quid pro quo corruption.”90
In Lair III, the district court did not consider the long-established
link between contribution limits and a state’s important interest in
preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. It assumed
Montana’s only interest in the laws was to “level the playing field,” and it
subjected the state to a heightened standard of scrutiny by finding that no
law could ever be narrowly tailored to such an interest.91 The court
asserted: “Simply put, the contribution limits at issue here could never be
said to focus narrowly on a constitutionally-permissible anti-corruption
interest because they were expressly enacted to combat the impermissible
interests of reducing influence and leveling the playing field.”92 The court
based this conclusion off of statements made in a voter pamphlet
explaining the original ballot initiative before voters approved the law.93
This assumption is unfounded. Even if part of the original law’s
purpose in 1994 was to rein in the growth of contributions overall, courts
have regularly found contribution laws have been enacted to combat quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance. Although part of the law’s original
purpose may no longer qualify as an important state interest, its dominant
purpose does. Therefore, because of the state’s interest in preventing
corruption and legal precedents set by the Ninth Circuit and Supreme
Court, the district court should have found the contribution limits to be
narrowly tailored to Montana’s interest.
88

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
90
Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1206 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Yamada v. Shoda,
136 S. Ct. 569 (2015).
91
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1035.
92
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1035.
93
Id.
89

2017

CASENOTE: LAIR V. MOTL

25

D. Amassing Sufficient Resources to Effectively Campaign
The court found that, under the current contribution limits,
candidates could not “amass sufficient resources to wage an effective
campaign.”94 However, by again disregarding precedent and pertinent
factors, its analysis did not adequately support that conclusion.
The sufficient resources analysis, like the narrow tailoring
analysis, had already been made in Eddleman, so barring external changes
like sudden cost increases for campaigns, this part should have largely
stayed the same. In Eddleman, the Ninth Circuit found that even though
Montana’s contribution limits were low, campaign costs were also
significantly low, largely because of Montana’s small districts. At the
time, Montana’s small constituencies could be reached via simple door-todoor campaigning and the necessity for advertisement in media was rare.95
By 2016, Montana’s population had not grown substantially,96 and if
anything, the internet and social media had made communication even
easier, so the district court’s contrary conclusion is strange.
Rather than considering the evidence the Ninth Circuit found
persuasive in Eddleman, the court based much of its opinion about the
inadequacy of campaign finances on a statistic provided by Plaintiffs’
expert that the average competitive campaign spends 7% more money than
it raises.97 While this statistic certainly could suggest a lack of resources,
the court failed to consider any alternative explanations for it. First, one
must ask if the statistic includes funds given by the candidate themselves.
Both experts indicated that portions of campaigns are self-financed.98 If
self-made contributions are not included in funds raised, then they could
account for the difference. Second, Montana laws do not allow incumbents
to hold over surplus funds to use for future campaigns or personal use. 99
Because of that, there is a strong incentive to spend each dollar raised;
campaigns that raised more than they spent would simply be inefficient.
Third, Plaintiffs, and the court for that matter, offered no explanation for
94

Lair II, 798 F.3d at 748; Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092.
See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (stating “The evidence before the district court showed that the
State of Montana remains one of the least expensive states in the nation in which to run a political
campaign. Montana's 100 house districts average only 7,991 people, its 50 senate districts 15,981
people. Legislative candidates in Montana campaign primarily door-to-door, and only occasionally
advertise on radio and television.”).
96
The 2016 census estimate places Montana’s population at 1,042,520. Therefore, on average, each
house district has approximately 10,425 residents and each senate district has approximately 20,850
residents. QuickFacts Montana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045216/30 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). Note that while this change does seem large compared to
the figures from Eddleman, Eddleman’s figures appear to have been based on the 1990 census even
though Eddleman was decided in 2003. Id. In reality, Montana has experienced less than 13%
population growth between the two cases. Id. (comparing 2000 census data to 2016 estimates).
97
Lair III, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1036.
98
Lair I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1080, 1083.
99
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13–37–240 (2016).
95
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how a change in contribution limits would change whether campaigns
spend 7% more than they raise. Relaxed limits could potentially reduce
the proportion of funds spent to funds raised. However, the proportion
could also stay the same as candidates continue to spend slightly more
money than they raise, just as they are already incentivized to do.
The district court also emphasized Plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony
that many contributors give to candidates at the maximum level and
greater funds would be available without the contribution limits.100
Common sense indicates this to be true; some contributors would likely
give more than the current limits allow if they could and greater funds
would be available to the candidates. However, the court, through this line
of reasoning and its reasoning above, made the wrong inquiry. Whether
competitive campaigns spend more than they earn and whether
contributors would like to give more than the limits allow are irrelevant.
The question before the court was whether candidates could “amass
sufficient resources to wage an effective campaign.”101 To that effect, the
court’s opinion does not answer the correct inquiry.
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Following the court’s decision, the current Commissioner of
Political Practices, Jonathan Motl, made a press release stating that the
contribution limits would revert to their previous limits because of the
Montana Supreme Court’s holding in State ex. rel. Woodahl v. District
Court.102 In Woodahl, the Montana Supreme Court held that when an
amendment to a Montana law is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining
part of the law remains intact as it had been before the amendment.103 The
limits struck down here were enacted by ballot initiative in 1995.104
Following this logic, the state enforced the pre-1995 limits for the 2016
election.105 Pre-1995 limits still set a maximum contribution amount, but
they were much more relaxed.106 Montana legislators will convene this
year and may determine the fate of campaign contribution limits.
Defendants have since filed for an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and
oral arguments are slated for March 20, 2017.107 In their brief for appeal,
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Defendants argue that the district court erred in requiring them to show
evidence of actual corruption to support a legitimate state interest.108 They
also argue that the district court ignored key facts and applied the incorrect
legal standard when assessing whether the campaign contribution limits
were closely drawn, so they urge the Ninth Circuit to reverse.109
VI. CONCLUSION
When Montana enacts laws to set campaign contribution limits in
order to combat actual quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and the
laws are closely drawn to that purpose, courts should uphold those laws.
Here, the district court held the state to a heightened standard when it
required the state to prove actual corruption and discarded evidence of
apparent quid pro quo corruption. The court also ignored decades of
jurisprudence indicating a strong link between contribution limits and
preventing quid pro quo corruption. Finally, the court made the wrong
inquiries in its analysis of whether candidates could amass sufficient funds
to wage an effective campaign under the contribution limits. The court
found that contributors may have given more and candidates may have
preferred greater contributions, but it failed to consider whether their
campaigns are effective nonetheless. The court placed an unduly
heightened burden on Montana throughout its analysis, and its decision
has disarmed Montana in its fight against campaign corruption.

Appellants’ Opening Brief, *16–18, Lair v. Motl, 2016 WL 5846101, (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 1635424).
109
Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 108, at *16–18.
108

